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1. Introduction
1
 
Policy-making and political processes imply putting specific societal problems on the agenda, 
and establishing permanent public organizations to deal with the issue in a systematic and 
continuous way (Jacobsen, 1964). This chapter analyses the political processes and outcomes 
within the field of internal security and safety in Norway, examining the development over 
the last 20 years. We focus on policies and specific crises that have led to changes in 
procedures as well as organization. We are  interested in the question of coordination 
between public organizations, and more particularly the coordination between the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice and other governmental bodies responsible for internal security and safety. 
Even though governments work continuously to assess and reduce risks and vulnerabilities, 
experiences from major disasters and crises have shown that unthinkable and 
unmanageable situations and crises do occur. They range from completely new and 
unforeseen crises, to risks that have been anticipated, but not properly assessed. These 
situations, which cut across administrative levels (central-local government), policy sectors 
and ministerial responsibility areas, can be defined as wicked issues (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). 
Such complex and fragmented issues do not necessarily fit into the established functional 
structures and traditional divisions between line ministries, underlying agencies and levels 
of government. Furthermore, central actors may lack the competence, resources or 
organizational framework to handle such extreme situations. 
This chapter addresses the reorganization of this policy area in Norway over the last 20 
years, a period influenced by the end of the Cold War and the realization of new threats 
related to severe shocks such as the 9/11 terror attack and the tsunami in South-East Asia. 
Also, domestic polity features, administrative tradition and culture, pre-established routines 
and an active governmental administrative policy will be taken into account.  
A central argument is that risk and crisis management challenges are typically found in the 
space between policy areas and administrative levels. The policy field of crisis management, 
internal security and safety typically crosses administrative levels sectors and ministerial 
areas, creating difficulties for those involved in preparing and securing safety. 
The end of the Cold War changed dominant perceptions of risk and threats in many ways, 
from an attention to Communism and conventional war, to other types of threats such as 
                                                 
1 This chapter is partly based on Lango & Lægreid (2011). 
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natural disasters or failures in advanced technological installations (Perrow, 2007; Beck, 
1992). Central authorities were forced to redefine their understanding and the content of 
internal security and safety. A new conception concerned the dividing line between the civil 
and military defence. In the case of Norway, it included the introduction of new principles 
for organization, accountability and coordination (Serigstad, 2003). 
From the early 1990s to the 2000s, several government initiated commissions emphasized 
the need for a stronger and better coordination within the field in Norway (St.meld. nr. 24 
(1992–1993); NOU 2000: 24; NOU 2006: 6). The Buvik Commission (1992), the Vulnerability 
Commission (2000), and the Infrastructure Commission (2006) proposed a radical 
reorganization, including the establishment of a new and separate Ministry for internal 
security, and a new Preparedness Act. However, many of the proposals were, as we shall 
demonstrate, not followed through.  
Internal security in Norway is characterized by an extensive division of responsibility. 
Proposals for an authoritative and superior coordinating authority has not been carried 
through. Thus, the field is frequently described as fragmented (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006; 
Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). The Commission reports and Government White Papers over 
the last years leave no doubt that problems related to the fragmentation and lack of 
coordination is realized by central government and coordinating bodies. Still, there is 
considerable disagreement on how to solve these problems. Policy proposals have not been 
transposed into new organizational or comprehensive legal arrangements. At the same time, 
Norway has been sheltered from large disasters and catastrophes. Combined with the 
immanent uncertainty of risk management, this policy field is particularly challenging, not 
the least considering a continuous fight for policy attention and priority. 
Focussing on problems of accountability, coordination and specialization within the field of 
internal security and safety and the reorganization processes in central government is 
interesting for several reasons. New organizational forms exceedingly confront existing ones 
as society faces new challenges. New Public Management-based reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s encouraging decentralization and structural devolution have increasingly been 
supplemented by arrangements that emphasize the need for more coordination across 
sectors and levels, labelled post-NPM, Whole of Government or Joined Up Government 
(Bogdanor, 2005; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Bouckaert, Peters & Verhoest, 2010). At the 
same time, the awareness of threat related to natural disasters, pandemics and terrorism 
seems to have increased. This has made the field of internal security an increasingly relevant 
topic (Christensen et al., 2011). 
The data in this paper is based on content analysis of central policy documents, mainly 
commission reports, government white papers, formal letters of assignment, parliamentary 
debates and documents, and supervisory reports. Also, a range of qualitative interviews 
(about 38) with central actors, politicians, commission members and senior civil servants 
have been carried out. Data collection and analysis was done by participants in the research 
project “Multilevel Governance and Civil Protection – the tension between sector and 
territorial specialization”. The project was financed by the Norwegian Research Council 
from 2006–2010. For a more in-depth description of the data base, see Fimreite et al. (2011). 
The chapter proceeds in four parts. Firstly, we present our theoretical approach. Next, we 
lay out central contextual factors, and present crucial principles and organizational 
arrangements. Thirdly, we describe important developments and central milestones in the 
efforts to reform the Norwegian internal security and safety policy field over the last 20 
years. Then, we analyze and explain the reform process. The chapter closes with a 
concluding section discussing findings and implications. 
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2. A transformative theoretical approach 
It is impossible to predict and map the probability of all accidents and crises. However, 
both public and private organizations are frequently faced with a demand to do just that. 
This means that governments have to handle both uncertainties and risks. Beck (1992) 
argues that there is an increased perception of a lack of safety in modern societies, related 
to the development of a risk society. In this perspective, advances in technology will 
potentially lead to disasters of great magnitude. A corresponding increased awareness of 
such catastrophic events will create even more challenges for responsible authorities. As 
people become more aware of risks and adverse consequences, the perceived level of risk 
will rise. Failure to manage risks might generate a potential for an even wider crisis. 
(Smith, 2006).  
A general theory on how and why crises happen, and how they best can be managed does not 
exist. However, the work of for instance Perrow (Natural Accident Theory) (Perrow, 1984) 
and La Porte (High Reliability Theory) (La Porte, 1996) are highly valued and have been 
widely discussed. In different ways they try to to explain how crises arise and might be 
avoided. In many cases, a crisis can be traced back to organizational failure or poor risk 
management. Our theoretical point of departure is that different types of coordination and 
specialization will have important consequences for actors within public bodies, for the public 
bodies themselves, and for the policy field affected (March & Olsen, 1989; Egeberg, 2003; 
Egeberg, 2004). We argue that the organizational lay-out of the internal security and safety 
field is of crucial importance to risk management (Fimreite et al., 2011). Organizational forms 
affect which issues get attention and which are ignored, how the issues are grouped together 
and  how they are separated. Organizational arrangements will therefore have vital 
importance for risk management. Furthermore, external pressures, developments and shocks 
(crises),  may well be influential and result in new perceptions, and organizational or 
procedural changes. 
Following this argument, organizational structure and operation can neither be viewed merely 
as a response to externally motivated influences and shocks, nor merely as a result of 
deliberate political choices. The organization of public administration, the relationship 
between the state and local level and between different sectors is not a mere technincal-neutral 
question. Organizations, seen as institutions, have an autonomous and influential authority 
based in established structures, rules, procedures, culture, traditions and dynamics (Olsen, 
2010). Public authorities are characterized by a complex interaction, between political and 
administrative steering, design, negotiation, diverse interests, cultural bindings, and adaption 
to external pressures and influences (Christensen et al., 2004). In order to fully understand the 
content of public politics and policies, we need to analyze organizational structures and 
organizations as well as policy content. The scope of action and notions of approriate 
behavior for civil servants is affected by organizational affiliation. This also affects the content 
of policies (March & Olsen, 2006). The understanding of problems, instruments, consequences 
and behavioural patterns are affected by internal features of an organization, and the 
relationships and connections to other organizations. Based on this, we assume that different 
forms of specialization and coordination are decisive for organizational behaviour as well as 
policy outcomes (Fimreite, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2011). 
In order to explain the development of the internal security field in Norway, we adopt a 
transformative approach, combining an instrumental and institutional perspective on public 
policy reform (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). The organizations within the field are not 
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merely seen as instruments, but  as institutional actors that not necessarily will adapt to new 
signals from political executives or to shifting demands in the environment (March & Olsen, 
1983). The institutional dynamics of reforms can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of 
environmental pressure, polity features and historical institutional context. 
The instrumental perspective directs our attention towards formal arrangements, while the 
institutional perspective focuses on informal norms, values and practices that have 
developed over time. Informal social roles are seen as impersonal, they exist independently 
of people within the organizations at any given point of time (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002). 
The  institutional perspective takes as a starting point that organizations are carriers of 
values, and have a distinct identity (Selznick, 1957).  
The instrumental perspective perceives organizations as disposable tools for the leaders 
involved. Within this perspective, rationality is related to the formal organizational 
structures, and creates limitations on actors’ options. The institutional perspective, on the 
other hand, opens up for a perception where organizations incorporate routines, rules and 
values that independently influence actors and their behaviour.  
Within an instrumental perspective, the underlying behavioural logic is a logic of 
consequence, based on rational actors that are assumed to be able to accurately predict 
consequences of choices, and find the means to reach their goals. Change is perceived as 
rational adaption to new goals or changing external demands. The concept of rationality has 
been modified somewhat by Simon (1976), who launched the concept of bounded 
rationality. This concept emphasizes limitations to the abilities to account for all possible 
choices and outcomes.  
Within the instrumental perspective we distinguish between a hierarchically oriented 
variant, where the leaders’ control and analytical-rational calculation is central, and a 
negotiation-based variant, which allows for the articulation of interests and for compromise 
and negotiation between organizations and actors whose goals and interests are partially 
conflicting (Christensen et al., 2004). An institutional perspective is, on the other hand, 
based on a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989). Here, human action is driven 
by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. This implies 
that action is based on experience, and on what is perceived as reasonable and acceptable 
within the specific context. Goals and means are discovered, explored and developed 
within the specific organization, and can be interpreted differently from formally 
established goals and ends. Thus, intrinsic organizational values may obstruct 
fundamental change. Organizations are seen more robust and change is usually 
incremental. Moderate changes will meet less resistance than major reforms. Frequent and 
extensive changes will generate extensive transaction costs, referred to as historical 
inefficiency (Ibid.). However, the possibilities for change are greater if reform proposals are 
in accordance with the existing organizational traditions and established culture 
(Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). These processes can be understood as path dependent, where 
former choices constrain later options (Krasner, 1988). 
A third perspective sees organizational structures mainly as a response to external pressures 
(Olsen, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This implies adaptation to 
established norms, beliefs and prevailing doctrines within a wider community, the 
incorporation of NPM values being one relevant example. It may also imply adaptation to a 
changing technical environment or to challenges and vulnerabilities created or revealed by 
external shocks and/or crises. 
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We use these theoretical perspectives in a supplementary manner (Roness, 1997), and argue 
that the organizational processes within the field of internal security and safety can neither 
be viewed one-sidedly as a result of instrumental processes and leader strategies, nor 
merely as a product of history, existent informal norms, or adaption to external pressure. 
Processes of policy formation and change are  characterized by complex interaction between 
different factors. This is vital when one wants to understand the organization and 
development of risk management. 
3. Context 
3.1 Ministerial responsibility, strong line ministries and autonomous municipalities 
Individual ministerial responsibility is a core concept within the Norwegian central 
government. The Minister, as head of a given Ministry, bears the ultimate responsibility for 
actions within that Ministry, including those of subordinate agencies. Ministerial 
responsibility in the Norwegian case implies strong sector ministries and a strong vertical 
coordination, resulting in a corresponding weaker horizontal coordination between policy 
areas and sectors (Christensen & Lægreid, 1998). Specialization by sector or purpose/tasks 
is a dominant principle, making it difficult to establish coordinative arrangements across 
traditional sectors. Consequently, sector ministries have been substantially stronger than 
ministries responsible for sector-crossing activities and coordination. This indicates that 
ministries operate as separate ‘silos’ with limited ability  to apprehend cross-cutting policy 
issues (Bouckaert, Ormond & Peters, 2000). 
Another central feature of the Norwegian polity is the concept of local self government. 
Local democracy and authority is a relatively strong value (Fimreite et al., 2002; Flo, 2004). 
Following the expansion of the welfare state after World War II, local authorities became 
responsible for providing a broad range of services. Greater municipal responsibility also 
meant a closer integration across government levels, and, at least until 1992, a sectorized 
organization mirroring central government institutions (Tranvik & Fimreite, 2006). A series 
of reforms aimed at municipal devolution was implemented from the 1980s and culminated 
with the Municipal Act of 1992. The new legislation aimed at joined-up (non-sectoral) 
government structures at the municipal level in order to counter the strong sectorization of 
Norwegian public government and the centralizing forces that allegedly reduced local 
government autonomy. Whether or not the reforms succeeded, is still debated (Ibid.) 
3.2 Internal security and safety 
The attention towards internal security and safety is quite new, both in academia and 
politics. The concept covers terms like ‘domestic security’, ‘civil defence’, ‘homeland 
security’, ‘societal security’ and ‘civil emergency’ (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006), and has 
gained currency since the beginning of the 1990s – even more so the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the US in 2001 (Kettl, 2004).  
At present, there exists no agreed-on international definition. The term ‘societal security’ 
(samfunnssikkerhet) is a specific Norwegian term. It is a rather broad concept, and does not 
differentiate between safety and security, or between natural disasters beyond human 
control and conscious destructive acts (Burgess & Mouhleg, 2007). Thus, it straddles the 
rather blurred boundary between civil society and internal affairs on the one hand, and the 
military and defence sector on the other. According to Olsen et al. (2007, pp. 71), a viable 
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk Management Trends 
 
172 
definition of the concept of ‘societal security’ could be “The society’s ability to maintain critical 
social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens’ basic 
requirements in a variety of stress situations”. It comprises all categories of actions intended to 
hinder unwanted events or conditions and to reduce the consequences should these occur, 
covering both preventive and proactive actions pursued in order to reduce adverse effects 
(St.meld nr. 17 (2001–2002), pp. 3). This covers both extraordinary events (e.g. hurricanes, 
terrorism, etc.) and more ‘ordinary’ events (e.g. traffic accidents, fires, etc.), and includes 
both internal security and civil protection and safety. It further communicates that national 
security is more than military defence and border control, and thus finds outlet for the 
Norwegian conception of ‘total defence’ (Serigstad, 2003). 
In this chapter, we have settled on the term ‘internal security and safety’. This has mainly a 
practical reasonIt is a conception that is more common and easily accessible for the 
international reader. By focussing on both security and safety, we emphasize that the 
outlook is not delimited to mere security issues, or to mere safety issues. Although the 
typical Norwegian approach covers both extraordinary and more ‘ordinary’ accidents, we 
will focus more on the importance of extraordinary events and risks.  
Inherent in this definition, and in our focus, is an explicit attention to the question of how 
government manages risk. At its heart, the policy field of internal security and safety 
concerns risk management and ‘the politics of uncertainty’ (Power, 2004). The problem 
both public and private organizations face, is that of responding to both anticipated and 
unanticipated risks. A particular difficult question is how to prepare for low-probability 
and high-impact events (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Organizations and organizational 
arrangements play a crucial role in the prevention of and response to risk (Lægreid & 
Serigstad, 2006, pp. 1379). Within this framework, reorganization can also be seen as 
means for managing risk.  
3.3 Central principles: liability, decentralization and conformity 
In Norway, three crucial principles for internal security and safety guide authorities 
involved in risk and crisis management. These are a principle of liability, a principle of 
decentralization and a principle of conformity (St.meld. nr. 22 (2007–2008)).  
The liability principle implies that every ministry and authority has responsibility for 
internal security and safety within its own sector. It is closely related to the doctrine of 
individual ministerial responsibility, emphasizing strong sector ministries. According to our 
empirical material, this has made the Ministry of Justice’s responsibility for horizontal 
coordination more difficult. Furthermore, the principle of liability is modified by extensive 
civil-military cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and its subordinate bodies. 
The decentralization (or subsidiarity) principle emphasizes that a crisis should be managed 
at the lowest operational level possible. This corresponds to the dominant doctrine of local 
self-government and authority. Consequently, the County governors and municipalities are 
given an important function in risk assessment and crisis management. At the regional level, 
the County governors operate as mediators between sector interests as well as state and 
local level administration (Rykkja, 2011). Traditionally, the Norwegian municipalities have  
enjoyed widespread autonomy within the field of civil protection. Territory, or geography, 
is therefore an important additional organizing concept Herein lays an important 
(organizational) paradox: the principle of liability implies strong coordination within 
specific sectors, but weak coordination across them. The decentralization principle, on the 
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other hand, implies strong coordination across sectors on a low level and hence less 
coordination between horizontal levels of government. 
The principle of conformity (or similarity) stresses that the organization forms under a crisis 
or a crisis-like situation should be as similar to the daily organizational forms as possible. 
This can be particularly difficult to maintain during an ‘extraordinary’ crisis. As current 
literature on crisis management emphasizes, when a major disaster happens, the necessity of 
supplementing existing formal organizations with improvisation and temporary 
organizations becomes crucial (Czarniawska, 2009). 
These three principles comprise a central fundament for the organization of internal security 
and safety in Norway. Nevertheless, several small organizational and policy changes 
beyond these principles have taken place over the last years. This is the topic of the 
following sections.  
4. The reform process: Reorganization of the central administration for 
security and safety 
4.1 From the Cold War to a ‘vulnerable society’ 
In 1946, a government appointed defence commission established the concept of ‘total 
defence’. This implied an integration of the Norwegian military and civil defence, with a 
primary task to protect Norwegian territory, citizens, national values and sovereignty. At 
the time, the orientation of the ‘total defence’ was mainly towards the threat of war, not 
crises or more delimited accidents (Serigstad, 2003). However, changes in the perception of 
threats and risks in the public sphere gradually led to the adaption of existing arrangements 
to encompass solutions that were more suitable to a new situation. The end of the Cold War  
created a new situation for both the military and the civil defence. Without a unitary and 
stable enemy, assessing risks and threats became more complex. This resulted in the 
adoption of a broader concept, embraced by both the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Defence. ‘Total defence’ came to imply mutual support and cooperation between the 
military services and the civil society, covering war-like situations as well as more delimited 
crises affecting the civil society. Today, it involves both contingency planning and more 
operative matters in all types of crises (Høydal, 2007).  
Internal security and safety was first conceptualized in a government White Paper presented 
by the Ministry of Justice in  1993 (St.meld. Nr 24 (1992-1993)), and further recognized by the 
Vulnerability Commission in 2000 (NOU 2000: 24). With these statements, the Government 
signalized a broader definition of the field, with less emphasis on the military dimension 
and more on the civil dimension and on crises that arise in peace-time (Lægreid & Serigstad, 
2006; Olsen et al., 2007). This new conceptualization implied a transfer of responsibilities 
from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Justice.  
Internal security and safety is a relatively new task for the Ministry of Justice. The 
construction of a Norwegian Civil defence started after the experiences from World War II. 
In 1970, a Directorate for Civil Protection was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Justice. At the same time, a corresponding preparedness office within the Ministry was 
created. Over time, there have been several attempts to strengthen the Ministry of Justices’ 
coordinating role (Høydal, 2007). 
The White Paper presented in 1993 (St.meld. nr. 24 (1992–1993)) clearly articulated a need 
for a coordinating ministry. However, the principle of responsibility was not abandoned. 
Ultimately, responsibility  was to be placed with whichever ministry had the administrative 
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and sector responsibility, depending on the type of crisis. Constitutional ministerial 
responsibility would still lie with the relevant Minister. Nevertheless, the interest of 
assigning the over-arching responsibility to a single ministry was strong. The coordinating 
ministry would take cooperative initiatives on behalf of other involved ministries in order to 
ensure better coordination of resources in both peace and war. 
Several candidate ministries were envisaged having a coordinative role. The Prime 
Ministers Office and the Ministry of Justice were the most prominent (Høydal, 2007). The 
Buvik Commission (1992) recommended a leading role for the Ministry of Justice, and this 
was supported by the government. A central argument was that the Ministry of Justice 
already was responsible for the Directorate for Civil Protection and Civil Defence, and for 
the Police and rescue services (St.meld. nr. 24 (1992–1993)). In 1994, the Ministry was 
formally assigned the task to coordinate civil preparedness across sectors (Serigstad, 2003). 
4.2 The Vulnerability Commission and the Ministry of Justices’ responsibility for 
coordination  
In 1999, the Ministry of Justice initiated a project with a vision to enhance the attention to 
the area of internal security and safety. This led to the establishment of a public commission 
led by a former distinguished politician and Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch. The Commission 
on the Vulnerability of Society (also called the Vulnerability Commission) presented a broad 
range of proposals in order to improve efforts to reduce vulnerability and ensure safety, 
security and civil protection for the Norwegian society (Serigstad, 2003; Lægreid & 
Serigstad, 2006; NOU 2000: 24). 
The Commission identified several problems concerning civil defence and internal security. 
One of its central conclusions was that the policy area was highly fragmented, lacked 
superior organizing principles, and was to a large extent organized in an ad hoc manner, 
responding to specific crises or accidents (Høydal, 2007). Allegedly, this resulted in 
ambiguity and serious liability concerns. A central argument was that the Ministry of Justice 
did not execute its superior and coordinative functions within the area very well. Civil 
protection and crisis management was mainly executed by a small unit with limited 
resources, and was not adequately prioritized. Overall, internal security and safety was seen 
as a policy area that had been systematically under-prioritized for quite a while. 
Furthermore, the Ministry’s coordinative responsibilities were vaguely defined, and 
therefore largely ignored by other relevant ministries and departments.  
The Vulnerability Commission concluded by advocating a higher concentration of 
responsibility, competence and resources, in order to give the area a stronger political 
foothold and ensure better coordination. One central recommendation was to establish a 
new Ministry for Internal Security and Safety, incorporating responsibility for assessing 
national threats and vulnerabilities, establishing main goals and standards within the field, 
coordinate efforts to handle terrorism and sabotage, as well as existing emergency 
departments and the civil defence. This implied a total restructuring of the Ministry of 
Justice, and a transfer of central administrative responsibilities from other sectors in order to 
ensure a stronger and more autonomous role for the new ministry.  
The Commission report was followed by public hearing and a government White Paper on the 
Safety and Security of Society (St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). The decision-making process prior 
to the White Paper was characterized by defensive institutional arguments and major conflicts 
of interest, especially between the justice and defence/military sector (Serigstad, 2003). The 
hearing did not provide any major changes to the original proposal. In the middle of this 
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process came 9/11, and the following organizational changes in the US administration for 
Homeland Security. The situation led to a delay and reassessment of the Commission’s work, 
but in the end it did not have any major impact on its conclusions (Ibid.). 
The proposal to establish a new Ministry for Internal Security and Safety turned out too 
controversial. Instead, the White Paper proposed a further strengthening of existing 
structures, by merging existing units and agencies, and by establishing new ones. 
Consequently, the proposals confirmed existing principles and doctrines of public 
organization and management within the field. The existing principles of liability, 
decentralization and conformity were maintained. The result is a rather ambiguous and 
hybrid organizational model (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006). 
The White Paper proposed the reorganization of several existing agencies and the following 
establishment of two (partly) new agencies; the Directorate for Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning (DSB), and the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) 
(St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). DSB was organized as an agency under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Justice. It supports the Ministry’s coordinative activities within the field, and 
consists of the former Directorate for Civil Protection and the former Directorate for Fire and 
Electrical Safety Inspection. DSB is responsible for overall emergency planning and crisis 
management, providing information and advice as well as supervising responsible 
ministries, county governors and municipalities.  
The National Security Authority (NSM) is responsible for protective supervision and the 
security of vital national interests, primarily countering threats of espionage, sabotage and 
acts of terrorism (NOU 2006: 6, Act of 20 March 1998 on Protective Security Services). 
Initially, the Vulnerability Commission wanted to establish NSM as an agency under the 
proposed new Ministry. This would mean a transfer of the agency from the Ministry of 
Defence. This resulted in a conflict of interest between the two Ministries involved, and 
between the two corresponding parliamentary committees.  
On one side, the Ministry of Justice and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice 
argued for a broader definition of the field and the inclusion of civil protection and safety 
within its realms. On the other side, the Ministry of Defence and the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee for Defence wanted to keep a focus on (military) security issues, and therefore 
also retain the administrative responsibility for NSM. The solution was a compromise. NSM 
was administratively placed under the responsibility for the Ministry of Defence, but would 
also report to the Ministry of Justice in matters concerning civil protection (Lægreid & 
Serigstad, 2006). 
The developments within the field illustrates how difficult it can be to restructure 
established arrangements, and transfer responsibility between ministries, even in situations 
where existing problems are recognized. The Norwegian case exposed a fundamental 
conflict concerning the framing of the field. Should internal security and safety be defined as 
a responsibility alongside many other equally important tasks, or should it rather be defined 
as a particular policy field, characterized by distinct and more vital problems and 
challenges? Was this mainly a security issue, and therefore a military defence matter, or was 
it rather a safety issue, and therfore a problem concerning civil protection and defence? 
Discussions on the degree of integration between civil and military protection and defence, 
and safety and security issues, continued. In the end, the White Paper was discussed jointly 
by the two Parliamentary committees. This indicates a shift towards safety and civil 
protection, since earlier these issues were mainly discussed in the Standing Committee for 
Defence alone. 
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The basic conflicts and challenges portrayed here have had significant consequences for the 
perception of relevant problems, policy solutions, of relevant actors and participants in the 
process. The process can be perceived not only as a clear-cut decision-making process, but 
also as a process of meaning-making, concerning the definition, interpretation and 
development of a common understanding, and as a process of constructing a certain 
political reality and negotiation ground for those best suited to implement the tasks at hand 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Kettl, 2004). 
4.3 The Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group 
The same reluctance to establish a stronger coordinative and authoritative role for the 
Ministry of Justice through more permanent organizational arrangements can be observed 
when analyzing the processes leading to the establishment of a Cabinet Crisis Council and a 
Crisis Support Group in 2006. The Indian Ocean earthquake and the following tsunami on 
Boxing day in South-East Asia in 2004 were crucial for the establishment of these 
organizations.  
Although the tsunami disaster hit abroad, it had important consequences for Norway. At 
the time, about 4000 Norwegian citizens were in the area. Most of them were on vacation. 84 
Norwegian citizens were killed. Because it happened abroad, and following from the 
established principle of liability, the situation was handled by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. However, the Ministry was not very well prepared for a situation like this, and was 
quickly criticized for their efforts to coordinate activities and responses, both within the 
Ministry itself and across other involved ministries (Brygård, 2006; Jaffery & Lango, 2011).  
After the tsunami, the Government presented a White Paper on Central Crisis Management, 
referring directly to the tsunami disaster (St.meld. nr. 37 (2004–2005)). It continued the 
discussion concerning the demarcation and responsibility lines between the different 
ministries, authorities and administrative levels involved in the crisis, and presented several 
measures to improve coordination and crisis management at central governmental level. 
This included an effort to clarify responsibilities for crisis management. More importantly, 
in a crisis the lead was to be placed with the Ministry mostly affected. The intention was to 
stall potential conflicts of competence and responsibility one had experienced on earlier 
occasions. This principle further emphasized the principle of liability.  
The White Paper also proposed the establishment of a Cabinet Crisis Council, and a 
strengthening of the administrative support through the setting up of a Crisis Support 
Group. The initial proposal was to organize the Cabinet Crisis Council permanently to the 
Prime Minister’s Office. However, this  was turned down, and the result was a more ad hoc 
organization. If and when a complex crisis that demands coordination at Ministerial level 
hits, any affected Ministry may summon the Council. It consists of the Permanent 
Secretary’s from the Prime Ministers Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, 
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When summoned, the Council 
functions as the superior administrative coordinating body, and is responsible for 
coordinating measures across the relevant ministries. However, the constitutional and 
ministerial responsibility still rests within each Ministry.  
The Crisis Support Group may be called upon in certain demanding crisis situations by the 
leading Ministry. It is formally organized under the Ministry of Justice, but can be called 
upon by any responsible Ministry and be expanded upon need. It is mainly an 
administrative resource supporting whichever Ministry takes the lead. The establishment of 
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such a group was originally proposed by the Vulnerability Commission, but not followed 
through until a larger crisis hits Norway, then. 
Corresponding to earlier policy documents within the field, the White Paper following the 
tsunami disaster emphasised the importance of the Ministry of Justice’s leading role in crisis 
situations. However, the principle of liability was not to be altered. A consequence may be 
an even more fragmented organization, whereas the Cabinet Crisis Councils functions may 
counteract the recently established leading role for the Ministry of Justice in certain 
exceptionally demanding disasters. 
4.4 The Infrastructure Commission 
A few months before the tsunami disaster hit, the Norwegian government set up a public 
commission to report on the security of critical infrastructure. This resulted in a report on 
the ‘Protection of critical infrastructures and critical societal functions in Norway (NOU 
2006: 6). Four issues were central: A discussion concerning the extent of public ownership, a 
discussion on the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice, a proposal for a statutory 
obligation for preparedness in local authorities, and a proposal for a new, overarching and 
sector-crossing Preparedness Act.  
The commission presented several proposals concerning the Ministry of Justice’s 
coordinative role, from having a superior yet advisory role, taking initiative and organizing 
collaboration and information, to being a national junction and reference point in crises that 
demanded international operations. Further, it argued for better coordination of relevant 
agencies (NSM, DSB and the Police Security Service, PST). However, the proposal of 
establishing a new and more authoritative Ministry for internal security and civil safety 
launched by the Vulnerability Commission was not followed up. 
The argument for a new Preparedness Act was that it would secure the integration of risk and 
vulnerability analysis, operational and supply safety, preparedness planning, information 
sharing, cooperation control and sanctions against both businesses and public authorities 
responsible for critical infrastructure (Bjørgum, 2010; NOU 2006: 6). The commission argued 
that this new legislation would give the Ministry of Justice stronger coordination powers. 
Nevertheless, the report did not provide a detailed review of existing legislation. The result 
was more a call for attention on the question, and it did not present any draft legislation. It was 
implicit that more research and analysis was needed before a new law could be enacted. 
The Commission report was followed by a new White Paper (St.meld. nr. 22 (2007–2008)). 
Here, the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice was defined as a responsibility for 
securing a general and coordinated preparedness. A sectoral approach to relevant agencies, 
County governors and Joint Rescue Coordination Centres across the country was 
emphasized. Hence, no radical reforms were proposed. The proposal to establish a new 
Preparedness Act was not followed up, although the White Paper recommended a more 
detailed examination of existing legislation in order to determine relevant priorities and 
problem areas. The most significant proposal was the establishment of a statutory obligation 
for local authorities to provide adequate preparedness. This was implemented when a 
revised Civil Defence Act was adopted in 2010.  
4.5 Critique from the Office of the Auditor General 
In 2008, the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General presented a report on the Ministry of 
Justice’s coordination responsibility within the field of internal safety and security 
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(Riksrevisjonen, 2008). The report was rather critical. A central finding was that several 
responsible Ministries did not perform adequate risk and vulnerability analyses, and thus 
did not prioritize risk management. It also pointed out failings in the Ministry of Justice’s 
audit of other ministries, and in its dialogue with them. Adequate coordination would 
demand the Ministry to take a more active and deliberate role towards its coordinative 
responsibilities within the field. The other Ministries found the coordinative responsibility 
of the Ministry of Justice to be unclear. A main conclusion was that, despite evident changes 
within the field, important challenges concerning accountability and coordination remained.  
The Ministry’s response to this critique was to establish a Ministries’ Coordination 
Consulting Group for internal security and safety. This is a common inter-ministerial arena 
for exchange of information and experiences, and for the discussion of general rules 
concerning preparedness. The arrangement followed the existing organizational policy, with 
rather weak network arrangements that do not threat the power of line ministries. 
The same findings pointing to an apparent lack of coordination can be found in the Office of 
the Auditors Generals report on goal achievements and efficiency in the County governors’ 
offices (Riksrevisjonen, 2007). The County governors have important coordinative 
responsibilities at regional level, and are responsible for preparedness, risk and crisis 
management within their region (Rykkja 2011). The report from 2007 pointed out that risk 
and crisis management was largely under-prioritized. Furthermore, there existed certain 
ambiguities concerning the County governors’ coordinating role, and that the coordination 
vis-à-vis municipalities and other state authorities within the region was characterized as 
rather ineffective. 
4.6 Summing up the reform process – a reluctant reformer 
The most important changes in the Norwegian policy for internal security and safety since 
the Cold War, have been the introduction of the three central steering principles (the 
principle of liability, decentralization and conformity), a development and clarification of 
the Ministry of Justices’ authority and coordination responsibilities, and the establishment of 
new directorates, agencies and more ad hoc organizational arrangements under the 
Ministry. This includes the Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group. 
Furthermore, responsibilities between central and local government have been spelled out 
more clearly through the establishment of a municipal preparedness duty. 
Our analysis reveals that the principles of ministerial superiority and autonomous local 
government have set distinct limitations on legislative and organizational proposals, on how 
they are formed, followed up on, and carried through. In general, established organizational 
forms are strengthened, resulting in a somewhat cautious adaptation to a new situation 
following the end of the Cold War. Although it took a very long time to realize, the 
establishment of a statutory obligation for preparedness within the local authorities 
indicates that the principle of autonomous local government may be easier to shift than the 
principle of ministerial superiority securing strong sector hegemony.  
A central tension has been the relationship between the military and civil sector (Serigstad, 
2003; Dyndal, 2010). The concept of ‘total defence’ signalized increased focus on civil issues. 
Over the years we see a shift from the military towards the civil sector and issues 
concerning internal security and safety (NOU 2006: 6). This has resulted in new relations 
between the military and the civil sector. An example is the establishment of the National 
Security Authority (NSM), subordinate to the Ministry of Justice in matters of civil concerns, 
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and subordinate to the Ministry of Defence in matters of military concern. This joint 
arrangement may result in tensions between ministries, concerning allocation of resources, 
establishment of central goals and priorities, and adequate steering and adequate steering. 
In the same period, there has been an effort to strengthen coordinating authorities within the 
field through the clarification the responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice, the Directorate for 
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), the National Security Authority (NSM), the 
County governors and the municipalities. However, our analysis reveals that the principle of 
liability has not been surrendered, and still stands strong. This continues to create tensions 
between organizational units, sectors and administrative levels. An indication of the complex 
relationship is that the different ministries are required to perform internal control and system 
audit within their respective sectors, while at the same time the Ministry of Justice and DSB 
audits the individual ministries. Høydal (2007) reports that it is especially difficult to get this 
arrangement to work. 
Experiences with certain crises have revealed that the responsible authorities are not always 
well prepared. This is also documented in the general literature on disasters and crisis 
management (Fimreite et al., 2011). A particular relevant example in our case is the handling of 
the tsunami disaster in South East Asia in 2004. This crisis revealed serious challenges related 
to the coordination and specialization between responsible ministries  (Jaffery & Lango, 2011).  
Organizational changes after the Cold War have been rather discrete. Parallel processes 
have been influential, and major proposals have been countered by strong sector interests. 
The experiences after the tsunami led to some reorganization in the central administration, 
but not to the establishment of completely new arrangements. This seems to follow a rather 
common pattern, where Norway has been labelled a reluctant reformer compared to other 
countries (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Other events, such as the Mad Cow Disease (BSE), 
also led to changes that to a large extent followed existing lines of responsibilities (Rykkja, 
2008). 
Our analysis shows that coordination and strengthening of central government in this policy 
area seems difficult, mainly due to strong line ministries with different interests, and also 
influenced by a strong preference of decentralized solutions following the doctrine of local 
self government. The government is reluctant to build up strong permanent core 
organizations in central government, with adequate capacity and resources, within this 
policy field. The Ministry of Justice remains the central coordinating body, but is still 
characterized as rather weak. Attempts to build a strong overarching coordinating ministry 
failed, largely due to the strength of the principle of ministerial responsibility. Crises have 
not resulted in radical changes. Instead, our analysis reveals incremental processes.  
5. Understanding processes and outcomes 
In accordance with an instrumental perspective, the development of a new coordination 
policy for internal security and safety can be seen as a process of deliberate and strategic 
choices following an interest in strengthening the Ministry of Justices’ coordinating 
functions. In this perspective, policy-making and reorganization are important tools, 
utilized to improve practices and results within the field. However, the process exhibits 
examples of bounded rationality, and local rationality seems linked to the relevant 
organizations’ apprehension of problems and solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). Changes in 
practices can partly be seen as relevant measures for ensuring the unity of the policy field 
and a strengthening of horizontal coordination. Our study has nevertheless shown that 
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conflicts of interests between central actors have limited horizontal coordination and the 
development of a coherent coordination policy. 
Institutionalized opinions and the persistence of institutions are central elements in an 
institutional perspective (Krasner, 1988). Our research reveals that the institutionalized 
tradition of ministerial responsibility continues to stand strong within the Norwegian polity, 
limiting the efforts to strengthen horizontal coordination. The processes can well be seen as 
a result of path dependency, that at least partly may explain why the changes within the 
field are incremental. This points to processes where former routines and established 
practices lead to selective and inconsistent attention to new problems (Cyert & March, 1963). 
The end of the Cold War represents an important contextual factor that might explain the 
gradual shift from a military focus to a stronger attention to civil protection and safety. It 
may also be regarded as a manifestation of historical inefficiency, where old organization 
patterns and understandings still linger and hinder major reforms and reorganizations, 
despite obvious changes in the context (March & Olsen, 1989). 
The events of 9/11 2001 happened at the same time as the Norwegian Vulnerability 
Commission worked with their report, and was definitely an external shock with important 
consequences for the American government (Kettl, 2004). However, we find little evidence 
that it had a decisive influence on the Norwegian reorganization process. The White Paper 
was put on hold for a while, but no radical proposals were put forward (St.meld. nr. 17 
(2001–2002)). Furthermore, many of the proposals of the Vulnerability Commission were not 
followed up. The incidents of 9/11 led to changes in terror legislation in many countries, 
including Norway (Meyer, 2009; Rykkja, Fimreite & Lægreid, 2011). The Norwegian 
government was obviously aware of a new kind of threat after 9/11, but it does not seem 
that the organizational changes and establishment of Department of Homeland Security in 
the US (described as the largest reorganization in the American central administration in 
newer history) had any major impact. 
The tsunami disaster in 2004 seems to have had a stronger direct impact on the 
reorganization processes. It hit Norwegian citizens more directly, and also created notable 
difficulties for the responsible authorities. Problems related to ambiguous responsibility 
lines and competences, and a corresponding lack of coordination between relevant 
ministries was revealed. This promoted the enactment of organizational changes within the 
central administration (the Cabinet Crisis Council and the Crisis Support Group). 
To some extent, Norway represents a special case, whereas it has largely been spared direct 
encounters with path-breaking and devastating disasters. The reform processes in the 
Norwegian approach to internal security and safety resulted in a reorganization of agencies 
reaffirming a network based model (Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006). Our study reveals a process 
and a policy field characterized by complex interactions between mutually influential 
factors. Rather than holding different explanatory factors up against each other as 
competing or alternative, we argue that they complement each other. External shocks and 
incidents have had an impact, but changes within the field do not always follow predictable 
patterns. Individual choices and behaviour can, at least to some extent, be determined by 
examining characteristics and changes in the organizations’ scope of action. However, we 
emphasize that this is not a deterministic relationship. Some scope of action for deliberate 
interference and proactive behaviour by political and administrative leaders remain.  
Firstly, our analysis of the reform process within the field of internal security and safety in 
Norway bear witness that reforms are to a large extent formed through established 
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organizational arrangements, doctrines and principles that set limits to the scope of action. 
Secondly, we find that the process and outcome cannot be characterized as a result of 
rational planning alone but has clear negotiation based features. The reform initiatives 
involved actors with partly conflicting interests, and the organizational pattern appears to 
be a result of turf wars, conflicts of interests, compromises, and the establishment of certain 
winning coalitions. Thirdly, the established arrangements and institutions seem infused by 
traditions, organizational culture, established routines and rules, and informal norms, 
values and identities. This has a vital independent influence on how work within the field is 
carried out, and more particularly on how crises are prevented and managed. Central actors 
do not necessarily easily adapt, neither to new signals from political or administrative 
leaders, nor to alterations in the external environment.  
Crisis and risk management typically takes place under uncertain and ambiguous 
conditions. In these situations, the prevalence of rational choices characterized by clear, 
stable and consistent goals, a fair understanding of available goals and means, and an 
apparent centre of authority and power, is not realistic. More likely, central goals will be 
rather unclear, ambiguous and partly conflicting, technological constraints may be 
uncertain, and there will be difficulties concerning the prediction of events and effects of 
relevant choices. In these situations, a flexible political and administrative coordination 
based on institutionally fixed rules, routines and roles may be a reasonable alternative to 
action based on calculated planning (Olsen, 1989). The extent to which such coordination 
processes succeed, is related to the existence of mutual trust and dependence between 
political and administrative leaders, between different professions, between central and 
local governments, between sectors, and between the population and government. 
In Norway, such high levels of mutual trust are relatively well established (Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2003). This is the case both between public organizations, and between the population 
and the government. It has facilitated the introduction of trust-based regulatory 
arrangements, such as internal audit and control. It can also explain a relatively high 
acceptance of strong measures in the fight against terror (Rykkja, Fimreite & Lægreid, 2011). 
An explanation for the high level of trust in the Norwegian community is that there have 
been few disasters or path-breaking crises that have challenged these trust relationships. 
However, there are also examples of crises that are largely the result of poor internal audit 
and lack of control, for example the management of an explosion accident that spread toxic 
gases in western Norway in 2007 (Lervåg, 2010).  
A discussion of adequate risk management raises the question of accountability. When risks 
with potentially large adverse effects are identified, the next step is to ask who is 
responsible, or who should take the blame? A natural institutional response is often to evade 
responsibility and try to avoid blame. If responsibility is not placed, the result is often 
damaging blame games. The tsunami disaster in 2004 may be a telling example. The 
reorganization process we have followed in this chapter also touches upon these issues. 
Accountability relationships in crisis situations are complex, and illustrate the ‘wickedness’ 
of the field of internal security and safety. A main a question is to whom account is to be 
rendered. Bovens has framed this as ‘the question of the many eyes’ (Bovens, 2007). Here, there 
is a central dividing line between administrative or managerial accountability, and political 
accountability. Fimreite, Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja (2011) show, by analyzing several 
different cases of crisis management in Norway, that managerial accountability is more 
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often discussed than political accountability. This is especially the case in complex crisis 
situations and in situations where problems cross traditional sector lines. Judging from 
these case-studies, it seems that politicians have a tendency avoid blame, while 
administrative leaders leave office. Because the decentralization principle dictates that a 
crisis should be handled at the lowest possible level, it can be seen to emphasize 
managerial accountability. The question of political accountability is a difficult one. 
Causes, as well as responsibility lines are often diffuse and difficult to trace. Politicians 
may frame policies, but administrators and civil servants implement them and have the 
operational responsibility, thereby creating potentially influential policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, the framing of the crisis is important, but may change over time, creating 
even more accountability problems.  
Lastly, professional accountability is often an important dimension. In situations of 
uncertainly, and often when ‘new’ risks arise, there are frequently disagreements concerning 
who has the relevant type of expertise, which type of (scientific) knowledge is the most 
reliable, and questions as to whether experts are independent (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996; 
Jasanoff, 1990). Conflicts between different groups of experts are not uncommon. In these 
kinds of situations the question on professional accountability is especially difficult to 
handle.  
6. Conclusions  
Our chapter has revealed that organization for internal security and safety is a struggle 
concerning both attention to and definition of relevant problems and organizational 
solutions. A central theme has been the establishment of permanent organizations that can 
address the wicked inter-organizational issues in a coordinated and continuous manner, 
with enough resources and capacity. We have also seen that the definition of problems and 
solutions varies over time, and is affected by executive design, historical-institutional 
constraints, negotiations and external pressures.  
The established principles concerning liability, decentralization and conformity represent 
different forms of specialization, but have little to offer when it comes to coordination, a 
particular pressing problem within the field. The principle of conformity seems particularly 
difficult to practice. The expectation that the organization model in extreme crisis situations 
is to be similar to a normal situation is difficult to live up to. Crises and disasters are in their 
being unexpected and surprising situations, where established organizational forms often 
prove inadequate. Generally, there is an urgent need for improvisation, rapid and flexible 
response. Often, established hierarchical structures, lines of command and competence areas 
are overstepped. 
The principle of liability is also problematic, whereas crises and disasters are exceedingly 
‘wicked’, in the sense that they typically cross established organizational borders. 
Increasingly, successful crisis management has to be performed at the interface between 
organizations and levels of administration. The principle of liability establishes 
responsibility within single organizations, but represents an obstruction for the coordination 
problems in a larger crisis situation. The principle of decentralization may also represent a 
problem, whereas crisis situations often demand a balancing of the need for a flexible scope 
of action at the local level, and the need for central control and leadership. A central 
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question is therefore how to handle the demand for more hierarchical control and 
leadership when major crises, disasters or risks threat society. 
Several studies have shown that military command and control methods in crisis 
management can be problematic (Boin et al., 2008). In crises of a larger magnitude, and 
where the issue crosses traditional institutional borders, crisis management may take place 
in the shadows of formal hierarchy, especially since there often is a need for flexibility, 
improvisation and network cooperation. Traditional risk management is often focused on 
single issues, neglecting the risk of complex and wicked issues.  
The two main doctrines in the Norwegian government system, the principle of ministerial 
responsibility and the principle of local self government, have quite clearly set limitations to 
the efforts to solve cross-cutting coordination problems. Our analysis shows that these 
doctrines stand firm. Attempts to establish a strong coordination at the centre over the last 
years have largely failed. Instead, we have seen a rather cautious upgrading of the over-
arching and coordinative responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice and its underlying 
agencies. New organizational arrangements have been set up as more ad hoc or virtual 
organizations without permanent resources attached.  
Organizing for internal security and safety is a constant struggle to gain sufficient attention. 
It concerns definitions of what are the relevant problems and organizational solutions, and 
has been concentrated on discussions on the establishment of permanent bodies that may 
work continuously within the field and with sufficient resources. Definitions of and 
solutions vary across time, and are affected by traditions and interest of the different actors 
involved. What we see is a mixture of rational design, negotiations, administrative cultural 
constraints and adaptation to external changes and pressure. There is no simple explanation 
to the reorganization processes. Our argument is that the reforms in this policy field are 
based on a combination of different driving forces (Fimreite, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2011). Both 
instrumental and institutional approaches contribute to the understanding of the 
reorganization process. Single-factor explanations face considerable problems when their 
claims are confronted with empirical data (Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010). The organization of 
this policy field is becoming increasingly complex with different organizational principles 
resulting from multiple factors working together in a complex mix. It is an example of a 
compound administrative reform process, which is multi-dimensional and represents 
‘mixed’ orders, and a combination of competing, inconsistent and partly contradictory 
organizational principles and structures that co-exist and balances different interests and 
values (Olsen 2010).  
The field of internal security and safety in Norway has developed and changed since the 
end of the Cold War, and has gained new focus and attention. The development of a new 
coordination policy is characterized by the shift from a military to stronger civil focus. But 
despite the radical proposals from the Vulnerability Commission and Infrastructure 
Commission, changes have been small and incremental. The tsunami disaster in 2004 
resulted in a new effort in the reorganization process, but largely only led to slight changes 
to the established responsibility relationships. The development on this field is distinct to 
other reforms in Norway, for instance the hospital reform and the Norwegian Labour and 
Welfare Service reform, where organizational changes have been more radical (Christensen 
& Lægreid, 2010). In these cases the government managed to implement large structural 
reforms. An important difference is that these reforms did not raise cross-sector issues to the 
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same degree. Both reforms happened largely within closed sectors. This confirms the 
strengths of the separate policy sectors in the Norwegian case.  
A strengthening of the central governmental core within the internal security and safety 
area has proved difficult in the Norwegian case. However, risk management can not be 
based on an excessive belief in hierarchy, command and control. To manage internal 
security issues by establishing central meta-organizations, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security in the US in 2003, do not necessarily reduce risk-levels (Peters, 2004).  
In spite of the reluctant organizational changes, our study illustrates that the field is still 
very fragmented. Responsibility is divided among several actors at different levels, at 
different levels, and within different sectors and organizational settings. There is a mismatch 
between the strong specialization by sector, administrative apparatus, and a policy field that 
does not follow traditional sector lines. A strengthening of the horizontal coordination 
between the ministries might be necessary to handle the need for better integration and 
horizontal coordination. The dominant steering principles and in the Norwegian system, are 
still fundamental cornerstones, and have not been altered. Thus, any change within the field 
will take time, or may possibly require the effects of a major and path-breaking disaster 
hitting Norway more directly.  
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